Challenges with the Current Social Security Benefit
Although Social Security has been the United States' most effective anti-poverty policy, reducing poverty rates among older individuals from nearly 40% in the late 1950s to around 9% today, poverty among subgroups of older adults remains a problem. For example, 4% of married adults versus 15% of single older adults fall below the poverty line. Women are twice as likely as men to be poor. Poverty rates among Black older adults are 18%, compared to 6% for Whites. Particularly striking is that nearly 30% of single, Black, older adult women live below the poverty line; the rate for comparable White women is 13% (Proctor, Semega, & Kollar, 2016) .
How is Social Security failing older adults? The first issue revolves around spousal and survivor benefits. Individuals who have been married for at least 10 years can qualify for Social Security based on marital status. At the full retirement age, they can receive a spousal benefit that is 50% of the value of their married partner's benefits. The survivor benefit when the partner dies is equivalent to 100% of the deceased's benefit.
Spousal and survivor benefits remain predominantly women's benefits. Just as in 1960, nearly two-thirds of women today draw on benefits based on their spouse's earning's record; although a growing faction of these women are eligible for both, a given individual only receives the larger benefit (Social Security Administration, 2015) . Women's lower benefits remain rooted in their lower levels of labor force participation and earnings, a function of both gender discrimination in the labor force and women's disproportionate responsibility for providing care for children and older adults (Kahn, García-Manglano, & Bianchi, 2014) .
So while spousal and survivor benefits offset the risks disproportionately faced by women, this protective feature of the program only helps those who marry. Historically, these benefits have been less helpful to Black and poor women, given their greater propensity to be employed and lesser propensity to marry compared to White women. Existing trends are exacerbating this problem. The percentage of women born between 1960 and 1964 who will never marry is 5.4% for college graduates and about 12% for non-college graduates. Moreover, among women born in the 1960s, the proportion of White and Hispanic women who will qualify for spousal or widow benefits when they reach old age will hover just above 80%, while just 50% of Black women will qualify (Harrington Meyer, Wolf, & Himes, 2006) .
Even among those who receive spousal and survivor benefits, the benefits are less progressive than the worker benefit (Harrington Meyer, 1996; Herd, 2005a) . For example, a widow who was never employed, but was married to a high-earning spouse, would end up with a larger survivor benefit than an unmarried woman engaged in a lifetime of low-wage labor.
The second problem with Social Security is that it is illequipped to deal with new income risks that older adults are now facing. The composition of retirement income has Public Policy & Aging Report cite as: Public Policy & Aging Report, 2018 , Vol. 28, No. S1, S35-S40 doi:10.1093 shifted over the past 30 years, from a mixed portfolio of individual and collective risk to one dominated by individual risk (Harrington Meyer & Herd, 2007; Employee Benefit Research Institute, 2015) . The fraction of workers with pensions has been declining, from 74 to 64%, and those pensions that do remain are largely defined-contribution as opposed to defined-benefit plans (Munnell & Bleckman, 2014) . Social Security is now the only source of retirement income not subject to the vagaries and instability of the stock market. Social Security's lack of an income guarantee makes it difficult for the program to adequately protect against the financial risks younger cohorts are now facing.
Addressing the Problem With a New Minimum Benefit Plan
A new minimum benefit plan (MBP) has become one of the most common proposals to address general poverty among older individuals, as well as to address the weaknesses of spousal and survivor benefits (Congressional Research Service, 2014; Favreault, 2009; Harrington Meyer, 1996; Herd, 2005b) . While the United States does have a meanstested minimum benefit, the Supplemental Security Income Program (SSI), it has miserly benefits, set at 76% of the poverty level; low uptake, ranging between 40-60% of those eligible; and strict asset limits, set at between $2,000-3,000 (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2014). In short, the combination of low benefits, asset tests, and administrative barriers to proving eligibility has made the program relatively ineffective.
Given the failure of existing policies, what is to be done? The models for our pension proposal are the Canadian Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS) and the United States' Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). Canada has achieved greater poverty reduction among older individuals, while spending only slightly more on social retirement programs than the United States and much less than other rich countries. This is due to Canada's near-universal Old Age Security and income-tested GIS program, which has no asset test and a relatively simple annual application process that permits an income test integrated with income tax filing. Over 90% of the eligible older Canadians participate in GIS (Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, 2010) , compared to about 50% of the eligible older Americans participating in SSI (McGarry & Schoeni, 2015; U.S. House Ways and Means Committee, 2004) .
The most similar U.S. welfare policy to the Canadian GIS, in terms of administration and benefit application procedures, is the EITC. The EITC delivers income supplements to poor, working-age Americans, has no asset tests, and individuals apply for EITC benefits through the tax system on a basic 1040 form. The ease of EITC eligibility and application procedures means that around 80% of those eligible actually receive benefits (Jones, 2014 ); a substantial improvement over SSI's 50% uptake rate.
Proposed Features of the Targeted Minimum Benefit Plan

Eligibility
The first feature of a targeted minimum is the program's eligibility requirements. The MBP would be payable at the Social Security normal retirement age, which is currently undergoing a gradual increase from 65 to 67. Eligibility would require at least 20 years of residency in the United States, as well as meeting normal old-age and survivor insurance (OASI) eligibility tests. Moreover, eligibility would be based on income, adjusted for marital status as linked to poverty income thresholds. Single individuals would qualify if their income fell below 100% of the poverty level for a single-person household. Married individuals would qualify if their income fell below 100% of the poverty level for a two-person household. Both individuals in the married couple would have to be of eligibility age for Social Security to top up income to the two-person household level.
Benefit Levels and Income Exclusions
The MBP should offer a minimum benefit guarantee of 100% of the federal poverty level for both single-person and married-couple households. There would be a general income exclusion, or set-aside, of $125 per month for all other income sources (earnings, pensions, property income). Those achieving eligibility for Social Security, which requires at least 10 years of earnings, would be eligible for the full minimum benefit. A full minimum guarantee should be available to those who have spent at least 20 years as residents of the United States since attaining 18 years of age and have 40 quarters of payroll tax coverage. For those who have not lived here that long, the income guarantee amount would be pro-rated based on the percentage of years that they have lived in the United States.
Administrative Structures and Uptake
A third critical aspect of safety-net pension programs is the administrative and eligibility structure, and the way that it impacts the percentage of those who are eligible who actually get benefits. As already noted, only 40 to 60% of eligible older individuals apply for SSI, compared to 90% or more for the Canadian system and around 80% for the EITC. Consequently, we propose a relatively simple and straightforward administrative design to reduce administrative barriers to uptake (Moynihan, Herd, & Harvey, 2014) .
MBP payments would be combined with the OASI benefit checks in a single monthly payment. Eligibility determination should be automatic through the income tax system. Thus, every older person needs to file an income tax return to qualify, similar to the way that the EITC is currently administered. Since only about half of all OASI recipients file income taxes, nonprofit and aging advocacy groups would need to help older individuals file a simple 1040, in much the same way that Volunteer Income Tax Assistance sites have helped low-income families with children to apply for and claim their benefits from the EITC. Key information on other income sources and liquid asset levels would be sent from the Internal Revenue Service to the Social Security Administration automatically. In effect, the MBP check would simply "top up" the OASI check to the determined percentage of the poverty level (with adjustments for other sources of income). Once older adults qualified for the credit, they would no longer need to refile the 1040, except in unusual circumstances when a person's income changed sharply. This provision is key to reducing any administrative burden that could hinder participation among older adults (Moynihan, Herd, & Harvey, 2014) . Because older adults' incomes are unlikely to increase, we do not anticipate meaningful overpayments would result from this provision. We expect that the income tax form qualification process would raise MBP participation to 80% or above, based on the Canadian experience and the EITC in the United States, including recent experience with the stimulus payments during the Great Recession.
Linking to Other Social Safety Net Programs
A central concern for this proposal regards whether increases in income from this benefit would mean some beneficiaries would lose access to Medicaid benefits. Given that 1 in 5 older adults uses Medicaid to supplement their Medicare benefits, this would be problematic. Without Medicaid, their out-of-pocket costs could eat up nearly 50% of their income, thus offsetting the increase in their Social Security benefit (Noelle-Miller, 2012) .
Consequently, persons who would otherwise be eligible for Medicaid should not be barred from receiving Medicaid if they received a MBP benefit that put them above Medicaid eligibility income limits. However, we are concerned about the potential administrative barriers that might arise for some MBP beneficiaries who had formerly received SSI-and thus had been automatically eligible for Medicaid-and would now receive the MBP. The delinking of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families from Medicaid during the 1996 welfare reform led to significant reductions in participation in the Medicaid program (Ellwood & Ku, 1998) . Given that the federal government is already coordinating closely with states regarding state-level Medicaid eligibility via the Affordable Care Act's Health Care Exchanges, individuals below Medicaid income eligibility levels could receive-at a minimum-notifications that they might be eligible for Medicaid, along with information as to how to apply for the Medicaid program. All individuals should receive an annual accounting of the size of the MBP, so that they have documentation, if needed, for applications to other social welfare programs.
Impact of the Minimum Benefit Proposal on Beneficiaries and the Budget
In terms of overall costs, in its first years of implementation our proposal is expected to be around $20 billion, or 1.7 % of current Social Security expenditures. Over time, the cost would decline to around less than 0.01% in 2089, largely due to the fact that the benefit would be indexed to inflation rather than wages.
The impact on beneficiaries, particularly those with low incomes, would be significant. Figure 1 shows how the MBP would influence poverty. The poverty rate among older adults would drop from 7.9 to 5% in 2025, and drop to 4.5% in 2035. Figure 2 demonstrates that these changes Figure 1 . Projected poverty rate among individuals aged 62 and older in selected years, by option. Estimates were derived from the Urban Institute's Dynamic Simulation of Income Model (for further details, see http://www.urban.org/policy-centers/cross-center-initiatives/program-retirement-policy/ projects/dynasim-projecting-older-americans-future-well-being).
would be concentrated among those aged 70 and older, largely because the benefit would not begin until age 67. Most strikingly, in terms of the redistributive implications, Figure 3 demonstrates that the income of those in the bottom quintile of the lifetime earnings distribution would rise by nearly 10%, or approximately $1,000 annually, while those with higher incomes would receive little to no benefits.
In terms of marital status and race differences, the benefit should reflect its targeted nature. Figure 4 shows how the pattern would vary by marital status. Those who had never married (-8 percentage points), followed by those who were divorced (-6 percentage points), and then widows/widowers (-2.7 percentage points), would have larger percentage point reductions in poverty as compared to married individuals (1.5 percentage points). The relatively smaller reduction for widow(er)s may reflect that this pool of beneficiaries, many of whom are formerly-married women, are expected to be less likely to meet the 40 quarter work eligibility requirement for the benefit. Finally, Figure 5 shows racial/ethnic differences. By 2025, poverty rates among Black and Hispanic beneficiaries are projected to drop by 6 percentage points, though it is worth noting that because Hispanics have a larger poverty rate to start with, the relative change in poverty would be much larger among Black Americans. This anticipated difference likely reflects the implications of the residency requirement, with greater numbers of Hispanics not meeting this requirement.
While the proposal would produce significant declines in poverty, it is important to note the longterm limitation of this approach. In short, as wages rise, the relative value of this benefit would decline over time. This is why the benefit would become less costly over time, but in relative terms, it also would become less effective at assuring income security among older adults. 
Conclusion
A new MBP in Social Security could markedly lower poverty among older Americans in a way that is affordable and politically viable.
1 There are a few features of our plan that distinguish it from prior proposals to include a minimum benefit in Social Security. First, it would tightly target benefits to those with the lowest incomes, taking into account family income resources. Prior proposals have not taken into account total family/household income resources, weakening their targeted nature. Further, unlike some prior MBPs that would require many years of work, this minimum would ensure that those most economically vulnerable-which are typically those who have not had consistent labor force participation (Favreault, 2018) -would be protected.
The second key distinguishing feature of this proposal is that it is sensitive to program interactions, especially with Medicaid. Nearly 1 in 5 older Americans use Medicaid to provide supplementary insurance for their Medicare benefits. Older adults with Medicaid coverage spend $3,000 
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Aged poverty elimination would not be possible with mechanisms tied strictly to Social Security eligibility. Whitman, Reznik, & Shoffner (2011) A new Minimum Benefit Plan in Social Security could markedly lower poverty among older Americans in a way that is affordable and politically viable.
less annually in out-of-pocket heath care expenditures than individuals who have to purchase private supplemental coverage (Noelle-Miller, 2012) . If an individual gains even $2,000 in additional income from a minimum benefit, but loses their Medicaid coverage, they may actually come out behind. While we believe that this plan would provide a reasonable level of redistribution, there are political and financial limits to redistribution within a mature contributionsfinanced, earnings-related pension program. Building in too much redistribution could undermine Social Security's widespread popular support. We do not believe, however, that this proposal crosses the line. Most of the world's largest and most effective poverty-reducing welfare states now include income-tested minimum benefits. Sweden, Canada, Finland, Norway, and numerous other countries with very low poverty rates have successfully implemented and maintained targeted minimum benefits at modest costs. We can learn from them and add our own, U.S.-style plan.
